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I 
Demographic shocks convey the idea of a sudden change in those factors, external or 
exogenous to the demographic system, that affect mortality, fertility, or migration.  
Famines and epidemics, wars and displacement of people, can be seen as external 
disturbances to the normal functioning of a demographic system. Malthus renamed 
them "repressive checks" and made them endogenous to the system - the inevitable 
consequences of unsustainable population growth. Under a traditional demographic 
shock, mortality goes suddenly up, fertility goes down, mobility explodes, families 
break down; the after shock, however, implies changes that counter the initial 
consequences. In other words a steady or semi-steady state is broken and populations 
struggle to recover the equilibrium. This paper could limit itself to draw on the 
abundant literature on the subject both on historical and contemporary cases. However 
confining the discussion to this definition of shocks appears a limitation to the wider 
scope of the conference that includes the consequences of long term changes such as 
aging or international migration, whose current levels and trends appear unparalleled 
in the past. Indeed they are defined as  "seismic shifts": and seismic derives from the 
Greek "seismos" or earthquake -- so, the idea is that we are going to experience an 
earthquake in slow motion, of which we already perceive the early subterraneous 
rumblings. My task becomes more difficult, because  I am required to deal also with 
long term profound changes that somewhat parallel those in store for the future.  
This paper will basically deal with four issues. The first one puts current changes or 
shifts into an historical comparative perspective. The second deals with "traditional" 
shocks, or violent disturbances of the system and their consequences. The third 
discusses the "seismic changes" experienced in the past, attempts their measurement, 
exemplifies their effects on population and society. The fourth deals with the 
relevance that past experience has for current changes.    2
II 
  Let us consider the "seismic" changes that the rich world is experiencing. I will 
consider the 10 largest rich populations (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, 
Spain, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands) that includes (2000) 767 million 
inhabitants according to the latest estimates (United Nations 2001), or 90 percent of 
the total population of  the rich world. I will consider one indicator of future growth, 
or the ratio of the population 0 to 4 to that of their (theoretical) parents, on average 30 
years older, aged 30 to 34. This ratio is easy to calculate and particularly useful 
because it is (a) a proxy of fertility, and very closely correlated with the total fertility 
rate;  (b) it reflects the degree to which the generation of children is able to replace the 
adult generation; (c) it is a good proxy of future population growth, net of migration (it 
is closely correlated with population increase over the next 30 years); (d) "shifting" 
this ratio into the future - with a 30 years lag or more - we have an idea of the stress 
that will be undergone by the system of intergenerational transfers. For the 10 
countries, the ratio was 78 percent in the year 2000, with a low of 55-56 percent for 
Italy, Spain and Germany and a high of 95 percent for the United States this only 
slightly below the 100 percent replacement level. The remaining 6 countries have 
ratios comprised between 69 of  the Netherlands and 87 of Australia. Over one third of 
the rich population of the world (the US)  is close to replacement ; about one fourth 
dangerously below.  In Germany, Italy and Spain one child will have to replace 
(almost) two adults, in production and reproduction, in social life, in the web of 
affections and loyalties. 
  More than half a century ago, in 1945, the rich world was closing the traumatic 
experience of the Second World war. Several millions young people had died in the 
war; in Europe and Japan births were at a minimum. These losses depleted the young 
male adult cohorts, so let us calculate the children-to-adults ratios for the female 
population alone. The ratios - at this crucial point of the history of the 20
th century - 
involve the relative few births of the early 40s and the 1910-15 birth cohorts, when 
fertility was higher (it had been affected only slightly by the war). It is, therefore, a 
moment of particular demographic weakness for the west.  The ratio for the 10 
countries was 116 (49 percent higher than that of the year 2000) with a maximum of 
178 for Japan and a minimum of 86 percent for Germany (see figure 1, that compares 
1945 with 2000). One could argue that this relatively favorable demographic situation 
contributed to the rapid process of economic recovery of Europe.  The ratios   3
calculated up to now  do not consider mortality attrition (or the losses between age 0 to 
4 and age 30 to 34) that in 1945, with an expectation of life for females above 65 years, 
would have depleted a cohort by about 5 percent (and proportionally lowered the ratio), 
against  1 percent in the year 2000 (expectation of life close to 80).   
  Can we find in the western world modern history instances of large populations 
whose newly born generations were unable to replace the generations of their parents?  
Let us consider periods of particularly acute demographic crisis. In the First World 
War Germany and France were the western countries that had experienced the largest 
military losses (respectively 2 and 1.3 millions deaths: 15 and 17 percent of the 
mobilized forces) and that, in the aftermath, had acute need of demographic recovery. 
Children-to-adults ratio (for the female population in order to avoid the war losses 
bias) for France (1921) was 74 percent - lower than the 2000 one of 83 percent - and in 
Germany 85 percent - higher than the current (2000) 55 percent. The situation was 
considerably more favorable in the UK (108 percent) and in Italy (126 percent). Even 
in the Soviet Union in 1923, after the war, the civil war and the famine, the ratio was a 
"healthy" 215 percent. Discounting a mortality attrition of 10-12 percent (and more 
than double in the USSR), would lower the ratios by a correspondent amount, leaving 
them at a level considerably higher than the current one (except for France). Note that 
the birth rate in 1915-1918 was way below the normal level of peacetime years. 
 More than a hundred years before, after the fall of Napoleon, and after the bloody 
wars that  cost the French army more than a million deaths, the children to adults ratio 
(female population) was a healthy 162 percent  (Bourgeois  Pichat  1951: 661) (which, 
net of a mortality attrition of about one third, typical of the high mortality levels of the 
times would be reduced to  108 percent).  
I have compared the potential for replacement and growth at the beginning of this 
millennium - after more than half a century of peace and prosperity - with the situation 
of periods of crisis, after conflicts that had depleted the adult population, lowered the 
birth rate, altered unfavorably the age structure. Only in the case of France in 1921 we 
find a situation worst than the average of the major 10 in the year 2000. Indeed the 
ongoing "seismic" changes pose challenges unparalleled in the past two hundred years.  
  Do we  really want to look for a period when the potential for replacement and 
growth was, almost all over Europe, and for a long time, badly hampered?  We have to 
go back to the late Middle Ages, when European populations were repeatedly  hit by   4
the plague. Biraben (Biraben 1979) has estimated that the population of the continent 
had declined 30 percent between 1348 and 1400. An extraordinary documentation - 
inquisitiones post-mortem - or inquiries in the succession to a man who had died - 
have provided the raw material (Russell 1948: 92-117) successively re-elaborated by 
Hollingsworth (Hollingsworth 1969: 375-88), that allows the calculation of 
replacement rates. The replacement rates refer to the male population and are the ratios 
between surviving sons and men dying and leaving a succession. Now these ratios, 
well above 100 percent before 1350, fall below these level from 1351-55 onwards, 
getting as low as 68 percent in 1381-85 and gradually recovering thereafter -- re-
emerging above the level of 100 percent  from 1446-50 onwards. The estimates of net 
replacement rates (NRR) made by Wrigley and Schofield (Wrigley and Schofield 
1981: 530) in their secular (1541-1871) reconstruction of the English population, 
shows that only the birth cohort born in 1641-46 experienced a replacement rate below 
100 percent (actually 98.8) in a period almost three centuries long (1541-1831). 
  Another aspect that has been cited as a component of the current “seismic shifts” 
is aging, and the associated structural pressures on intergenerational relations and 
transfers and impact on fiscal and social policies. Is the current trend in aging different 
– in speed and intensity – from the past?  There are two components in aging, the first 
related to the fall of the birth rate (aging from the “bottom” of the pyramid) and the 
second related to increasing survival of generations reaching old age (aging from the 
top). The first component has dominated the aging process until the ‘70s, but its 
impact has been declining thereafter once the birth rate had reached its bottom level. 
Increasing survival at old ages has been accelerating in the second part of the 20
th 
century and is projected to continue in the future as expectation of life increases. 
Forecasts or projections of indicators of aging (percent of the population over a certain 
age; mean or median ages of the populations etc) depend heavily on hypotheses as to 
the future courses of fertility and migration (which are renewing the pyramid from the 
bottom); hypotheses on old age survival are also important but less “unpredictable” 
given the gradual historical changes in mortality and the fact that “potential” old age 
individuals 10, 20 or 30 years from now are mature cohorts already in existence. In the 
“major 10” rich countries, population over 65 has increased 73 percent between 1950 
and 1975 and 56 percent between 1975 and 2000, and is expected to increase 54 
percent between 2000  and 2025 (and 16 percent between 2025 and 2050). As a 
percentage of the total population, persons over 65 have increased from 8.2 percent in   5
1950 to 11.1 in 1975 and 14.9 in 2000, and are expected to grow to 21.7 per cent in 
2025. So while “relative aging” is accelerating, the increase of the total number of old 
people is decelerating. 
  A broader picture of the changes in the age structure can be gained from figure 2, 
showing the mean age, the proportions below 15 and over 65, of the population of the 
“major 4” western European countries (France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom) from 1870 to 2000 (and the projected value for 2010, a date close enough 
yielding an estimate that can be safely relied on). The acceleration of the process of 
aging since the 1970s is quite evident, after a plateau in the central part of the century 
and a continuos increase from the end of the 19
th to mid 20
th century. 
  For a very long view of age-structure modifications, let us again look at England 
in the three centuries after 1541 (Wrigley and Schofield: 1981). The population over 
60, for instance, has gradually increased from a minimum of 7.2 percent in 1566-71 to 
a maximum of about 10 percent in 1711-21, than gradually declining to a new 
minimum of 6.5 percent in 1826-36. These are significant but mild and slow changes 
hardly comparable with the swift fluctuations of modern times.  
  The process of aging will undoubtedly deeply affect  western societies in future 
decades. But what really matters, in the long run, is the process of renewal and 
reproduction of the population, and its potential for growth. Never in the past – not 
even after long and deadly crises – has this process fallen to negative levels as it has at 
the transition of the millennium. Hence a somewhat disturbing question: is prosperity, 
and the dearth of births associated with it, the fourth knight of the (demographic) 
Apocalypse, riding astride with war, plague and famine?  
III 
Traditional shocks, or violent disturbances of the system caused by a sudden increase 
in deaths, have been the recurrent lot of high mortality in western populations. Indeed 
the gradual decline of mortality since the late 18
th century has been characterized by a 
reduction of the number and intensity of mortality fluctuations. Major mortality  
shocks – or mortality crises entailing a doubling or more  of the number of deaths in 
“normal” years – could normally hit a population once or twice over a generation 
(about 30 years). The highest incidence of crises in Europe occurred during the 
century following the arrival of the plague in (1347). In Tuscany mortality peaked in 
1348, 1363, 1374, 1383, 1390, 1400. In the period 1340-1450 a crisis (defined as a   6
threefold or greater increase  over the normal number of deaths) occurred roughly 
every 9 years, and the average crisis represented a sixfold increase over the “normal” 
number of deaths (Livi-Bacci 1980). More or less the same frequency occurred in the 
other European countries – from England, where a pestis secunda is recorded in 1361 
until a pestis quinta in 1391, to Russia with plague years in 1363-65, 1374-77, 1387-
90 and 1396 (Livi-Bacci 1999: 73). In Tuscany, typhus-related mortality, in 1649, 
produced an increase of deaths 100 percent or more above normal in 25 out 34 
municipalities on record (Del Panta 1980: 165).  France, the largest country in Europe 
after Russia, suffered two devastating subsistence crises in 1693-94 and 1709-10, each 
one implying a doubling of the number of deaths.  The frequency and intensity of 
crises declined during the 18
th century, but the periphery of Europe continued to suffer 
until the 19
th century: in Ireland the Great Famine produced an excess mortality of 1.1-
1.5 million deaths in 1846-47 (at least a fourfold increase); in Finland famine induced 
mortality, in 1868, was three times greater than normal (Pitkänen 1993).  A 
chronology would be out of place here: I wish only to make a general point. In a high 
mortality population (with a 3 percent death rate in “normal” years) a doubling of 
mortality – caused by plague, typhus, famine or other disturbances - would have 
caused an approximate decline of the population of 3 percent. Assuming that in normal 
times the population could grow at the speed of .3 percent (actually the population of 
Europe doubled between 1450 and 1750, with a rate of growth of about .2 percent), 10 
years would be required in order to recover the pre-crisis size. 
Things were a little more complicated than the above simple arithmetic calculations. 
The impact of the shock as well as the after-shock recovery were a function of many 
factors such as  the cause and nature of mortality and its age pattern (smallpox killed 
the young, plague at all ages etc); whether or not the killing disesase induced 
immunity in survivors; the negative impact on nuptiality and fertility and their 
rebounds;  selection operated by migration. Figure 3 sketches the paradigm of a 
mortality crisis in a typical high mortality setting (Livi-Bacci 2000: 41). Let us assume 
that the mortality crisis was induced by an epidemic: its effects can be outlined as 
followed. 
Deaths and mortality. The diffusion of the epidemic determined an increase in the 
number of deaths: as the number of non immune people decreases and the number of 
the immune increases, deaths, after reaching a peak, rapidly decline  and bottom out at 
a level lower than the pre-crisis one. This is due to a double effect: the first is the   7
decline in size of the population, the second the weeding out, caused by the crisis, of 
the vulnerable, weak and frail in higher proportion than the rest of the population. As a 
consequence the number of deaths and the death rate fall below the pre-crisis level and 
this favorable effect lasts a few years before normality is restored. 
Births and fertility. Conceptions usually decline when mortality increases, reach a 
minimum when mortality peaks and rebound to a maximum one or two years after the 
crisis. Births follow the same course with a nine months lag. The reason for the 
decline in conceptions are many: decline of new marriages; decline in sexual 
intercourse caused by stress; deliberate control; decline of fecundity because of 
starvation or infection. Increase in fetal losses may determine further decline in births. 
The rebound in conceptions and births may be due, among others, to the recovery of 
marriages, but also to increase of marital fertility. Even in non-controlling populations, 
there is evidence that cohorts formed after the crisis had a (natural) fertility higher than 
pre-crisis couples.  
Marriages and nuptiality. When mortality increases, marriages are postponed or made 
impossible by death; after the crisis there is a recuperation of postponed marriages,  an 
increase of marriages of widowed people, an acceleration of marriages made possible 
by transmission of property of deceased parents etc. 
Natural increase. Strongly negative during the crisis, positive and higher-than-normal 
after the crisis, owing to the opposite rebounds of mortality and fertility. Return to 
normal patterns after a few years. 
Mobility and migration. Increased out migration from the affected area during the 
crisis; outmigrants return after the crisis. Possible permanent losses of long-term 
outmigrants. 
  The textbook model outlined above maybe difficult to identify in the profile of 
many mortality crises of the remote (and less remote) past because of the varying 
combination of factors at play and the varying pattern of their insurgence and 
development. However, the forces indicated above are at work, and the paradigm 
recognized, in most mortality crises, included those induced by the two world wars of 
the 20
th century.   8
IV 
  The depopulation of Europe in the century long period after 1348 had a profound 
impact on economy and society. Depopulation implied abandonment of farms and 
villages: all over Europe the number of lost villages increased. Demand for food 
declined everywhere, cultivations were abandoned and land turned into pasture 
(Slicher van Bath 1963). Prices of cereals declined everywhere and a shortage of 
manpower resulted in an increase of real wages. Demand for meat increased and diets 
improved, but this further stimulated the conversion of land into pasture (Boserup 
1981: 95-96). The entire agricultural system underwent a profound process of 
extensification.  The case of Languedoc, extensively studied by Le Roy Ladurie (Le 
Roy Ladurie 1969) can serve as an example in a variety of similar situations. 
Population reached a minimum in 1450 with a series of typical consequences. As 
elsewhere, villages were deserted and fields abandoned. Woods and forests regained 
the ground lost during the previous demographic growth cycle initiated in the 11
th 
century. Stagnant waters expanded and so did fevers associated with them. Prices of 
basic staples went down, manpower was rare and wages went up. However there were 
additional interesting consequences concerning the distribution of land ownership. In 
Albi the extension of properties remained unchanged between 1343 and 1357, but the 
number of taxpayers went down from 1623 to 686. The mean size of holdings 
increased,  since small ones disappeared or merged in larger units. This process of 
recomposition of farms and properties made economic sense in a system poor in labor 
but rich in land. 
The population crisis produced also another interesting institutional change. Landlords 
were forced to be less exacting towards their bondsmen and tenants. The attempt to 
tighten the bonds of servitude failed, because it was easy to move or emigrate "and 
this emigration contributed towards the total disappearance of bondage in most of 
Western Europe (in the East it was on the increase). The only way to keep or attract 
tenants, fermiers or métayers was to give in to their demands and lighten their dues." 
(Duby 1972: 213). The crisis of the seigneurial estates went to the benefit of peasants.   
 Another interesting phenomenon accompanied the recomposition of properties, and 
this was a process of restructuration of families in larger units. Married brothers and 
their families remained united in frèreches under the authority of the father. Dotal and 
succession rules reinforced this process, and “all these rules underline the surprising 
strengthening of the family as an institution between 1300 and 1500. The extended 
family was a paternalistic and suffocating institution, but very protective towards   9
children  with old and young couples bound for life.” (Le Roy Ladurie 1969). Writes 
Duby (Duby 1972:184) "while the demographic catastrophes and the concomitant 
migrations were leading to the disintegration of the family framework, it seems that 
the bonds  of kinship grew  tighter in the face of need.  The large family units subject 
to the strict control of the eldest male again came into being, and the affrèrement, 
fraternal joint-ownership associations  frequently grouping together  men from 
different families, increased in number. These compact groups were the only effective 
defense against the difficulties resulting from depopulation". The cities that had 
expanded until the beginning of the fourteenth century, were demographically and 
economically depleted and put in action policies favoring immigration. 
 
  Population decline in the plague age may have had yet another  relevant 
consequence. In Italy, France and elsewhere, documentary evidence shows rather 
peculiar patterns of marriage, very precocious for women but much later for 
men.Working with the Florentine cadastre of 1427, Herlihy and  Klapisch have 
derived an average age at marriage of 17.6 for Florentine women, that increased to  
20.8 in 1480; men married on average ten years later (Herlihy and Klapisch 1978). 
Women of Prato married at 16.8 years on average in 1372 and at 21.1 in 1480. The 
trend in the countryside was similar, although age differences between brides and 
grooms were smaller. The situation in France – in Toulouse, Périgueux, Tours – was 
similar. Christiane Klapisch concludes that “throughout Europe, adolescents between 
14 and 18 years old became the brides of men six to ten years older" (Klapisch 1988). 
Russell and Hajnal have reached similar conclusions for England according to the Poll 
Tax of 1377, although these conclusions have raised controversies. Little is known 
about pre-plague marriage patterns. The hypothesis has been made that the high 
nuptiality system prevailing in the late fourteenth and fifteenth century was a structural 
reaction to the devastating plague losses and a breaking down of the economic 
obstacles (scarcity of land, for instance) that restricted access to marriage.    
Besides the effects on the marriage system (up to now nothing more than an 
hypothesis), plague-related human losses put in motion rebounding mechanisms that 
determined a population recovery in the second part of the fifteenth century. In much 
of Europe – as in Languedoc -  depopulation seems to have sorted the effect of 
reorganizing the surviving “human capital” in larger units  (families) more efficient in 
dealing with a sudden increase of per-capita physical capital. 
V   10
Certainly the best known and most extensively studied mortality crisis after the plague 
is the Great Irish Famine of mid-nineteenth century. There are many reasons for the 
great interest in the famine: it happened in the aglosaxon cultural area and this has 
converted the Famine in the focus of the developed world; it fits well the Malthusian 
paradigms; it has been seen as the crucial factor of the transformation of the Irish 
demographic and social system; it has been the most deadly episode in a large western 
population (Finland in the 1690s and Iceland in 1780 have suffered deadlier crises, but 
their populations were much smaller).  Finally there is another aspect of great interest 
for our purposes: the Great Famine initiated a long-lasting cycle of population decline, 
from 8.2 million people in 1841 to 5.4 in 1871 and 4.5 in 1901. There is no other 
instance, among western nations, of a sustained population decline after the Industrial 
Revolution, if we exclude the case of the Democratic Republic of Germany whose 
population fell, between 1950 and 1990, from 18.4 to 16.2 million. Prior to Ireland, the 
last episode of a sustained and large decline is that of the German population in the 
first half of the seventeenth century as a consequence of the devastation of the Thirty 
Years war (a fall from 16,2 in 1600 to 9 or 10 million in 1650 in the area 
corresponding to 1914 Germany) (Pfister 1992).  
Interpretations of the consequences of the Great Famine are not unanimous, but its 
demographic consequences are well known (Edward and Williams 1957; Mokyr 1983; 
Mokyr and O’ Grada 1984; O’ Grada 1993). The death toll of the potato blight was 
enormous: it has been estimated that 1.9 million died in 1846-50, with an excess of 
deaths of about 1.1 million (13.4  percent the population recensed in 1841); about 
200.000 people per year left Ireland between  1847 and 1854. Age at marriage 
increased and the proportion remaining single declined, and mass migration (mainly to 
America) continued throughout the century. Fragmentation of land gave way to the 
recomposition of holdings in larger units. Inheritance customs changed. A classic 
interpretation of the events associated with the Famine is typically malthusian 
(Connell 1950). In Connell’s view, a natural tendency of the Irish to marry early was 
inhibited by the difficulty of obtaining land on which to build a house and start a 
family. This obstacle was removed  in the second half of the eighteenth century by a 
series of complex factors – among them the great success of the potato – which 
allowed the extension of farmland. As a consequence nuptiality increased and, 
together with a high natural fertility and a not too high mortality, this resulted in a high 
rate of growth. Population increased from 3.2 million in 1751 to 6.9 in 1821 and 8.2 in 
1841. Connell wrote “In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries it is clear   11
that the Irish were insistently urged and tempted to marry early: the wretchedness and 
hopelessness of their living conditions, their improvident temperament, the 
unattractiveness of remaining single, perhaps the persuasion of their spiritual leaders, 
all acted in this direction” (Connell 1950: 81-2). The increasing demand of foodstuff 
in England lead to the expansion of arable land and to its subdivision for a fast 
increasing population of tenant farmers; subdivision was enhanced by the rapid 
diffusion of the potato as the main (and highly productive) food staple of the Irish. But 
this equilibrium became precarious as a result of excessive growth until the Great 
Famine permanently upset the old demographic and social order. During the following 
decades a new régime of land use and ownership and a new nuptial order (late 
marriage and high proportion of unmarried), supported by the large landowners and 
clergy, together with massive migration resulted in a steady decline of the population. 
The average age of women at first marriage increased from 23-24 between 1831 and 
1841 (a level already higher than the one prevailing in previous decades) to 27-28 at 
the end of the century. The proportion of married women in fertile age declined and at 
the end of the century about one fifth of  those above age 50 (and one fourth among 
men) had never married. Extraordinary mortality and massive emigration “emphasized 
the precarious nature of an agrarian system based on sub-division and potato culture, 
and particularly from the 1870s, the existing trend towards consolidation of holdings 
accelerated, strengthening the forces leading to emigration” (Clarkson 1982: 244). 
Certainly the fear of the repetition of the disaster had a profound impact at the 
individual as well as at the societal level. 
 Recent scholarly work has greatly deepened the understanding of the Irish case. Mass 
emigration was not initiated by the Famine but had been increasing in the preceding 
decades; age at marriage was probably not so precocious as many thought and an 
increase was already evident before the famine; profound differences existed – before 
and after the famine – between the east and the west of the country, that was far from 
being homogeneous, and responded in different ways to the catastrophe. The strains 
that exploded with the famine were already evident and it is legitimate (although not 
very productive) to think that they would have eventually lead to a gradual 
abandonment of the old system. But the profound shock of the  Famine certainly was  
more than a mere catalyst of the transformation. 
Did Ireland perform, under the economic profile, less well than other European 
countries? According to Maddison (Maddison 1995), the average GDP per capita of 
15 European countries in 1820 was 1142 dollars (Geary-Khamis 1990 dollars) against   12
954 for Ireland (Ulster excluded); in 1900,  the European average was 2583 against the 
Irish 2495, with a gap considerably reduced in relative as well as in absolute terms. In 
1820 only three countries (Russia, Finland and the part of the Austrian-Hungarian 
Empire corresponding to former Czechoslovakia) were doing worst than Ireland; in 
1900 two more countries – Spain and Italy – must be added to the former three.  
VI 
The Great Irish Famine is not the last crisis typical of the old demographic régime in 
Europe. The northern and eastern periphery of Europe continued to suffer severe 
episodes emerging in backward rural contexts, generally the consequence of bad 
harvests. The 1860s were years of high mortality not only in small Finland (a threefold 
increase of deaths in 1868) but also in Russia where famines were recorded in 1872-3, 
1882-84, 1892, 1906 and 1911. But from the 1870s famines became more localized 
than in the past, retreating from the North, the West and the Center of the country  and 
the Black Earth region and concentrating in the Volga region, southern Ukraine and 
Northern Caucasus (Ademets forthcoming). Famine hit Russia again in 1921-22, 
causing a high number of deaths in the Volga region and Ukraine. However the 1921-
22 losses are only the final act of the troubled decade initiated in 1914, compounding 
military and civil losses due to the world war and to the civil war, the effects of the 
influenza epidemic and those of the famine, and the general territorial, economic and 
social dislocation caused by the Revolution. “Excess deaths amounted  to about 
sixteen million - soldiers and civilians who were  killed or who died prematurely. 
Simultaneously, the birth rate temporarily declined, and as a result the number of 
children born in this period was ten million less then normal. At the beginning of 1923, 
the population was 4-6 million smaller then in 1914, and some 28 million smaller than 
it would have been if pre-war death and birth trends had continued”  (Wheatcroft and 
Davies 1994: 57-8). 
It is in the Soviet Union that the last European, hunger-related, catastrophic event took 
place. Accelerated industrialization, increased appropriation of grain from the peasants, 
forced collectivization, liquidation of the kulaks, production declines and hunger are 
the main links in the chain of event that led to the famine of 1932-33 and to millions of 
deaths. A recent estimate of the losses due to these series of events leads to a 
“plausibility range” of excess deaths between 5.6 and 13.4 million in the intercensal 
decade 1927-36, with a mid-range estimate of  9.5 million (Livi-Bacci 1993). Figure 4 
shows the monthly series of death and conception rates for rural Ukraine in 1931-34.  
The sequence of events; the political determinants; the intermediate factors of the high   13
mortality and the demographic impact closely resemble the patterns of 1959-61 
Chinese catastrophe following the Great Leap Forward. 
    The direct determinants of the crisis are evident: hunger, together with 
typhus and other epidemics, and outright starvation are certainly the immediate causes 
of human losses. Hunger was – at least partially – determined by a poor harvest in 
1932: it is commonly held that the areas sown diminished, fields were not properly 
harvested and productivity in the collectives went down. Increased procurement and 
exports of cereals compounded their effects and deprived the producers in favor of 
urban populations or particular sectors of the population “entitled” to special treatment. 
The crisis was largely man-made, or policy-generated, quite different from other crises 
of the past.  Other “intermediate” factors are likely to have amplified the crisis. The 
“great turn”, the “leap forward” and the brutal collectivization that went with them 
weakened the social fabric, crippled the traditional defenses to economic and social 
stress and amplified the effects of the economic disaster. These “intermediate” factors 
can be classified under different headings, each acting with different force, but all 
pushing in the same direction. The first factor was residential dislocation. Its negative 
effects were all too evident in the case of deportations which accompanied 
dekulakisation, but dislocation hit millions of migrants who built industrial 
“konbinats” or worked in gigantic public projects. The efficiency of mutual help in 
case of stress provided by the family or the community was probably lowered for 
millions of people. The mass phenomenon of abandoned children reappeared all over 
the Soviet Union. On the other hand, mobility was prohibited (re-introduction of 
internal passports; prohibition of the sale of railway tickets to farmers etc) when it 
might have been a counteractive measure to starvation and disease. Secondly, 
collectivization deprived peasants of some of their traditional buffers against 
nutritional stress. Private plots and individual trading was prohibited, thus eliminating  
an important source of food and income; forced to join the collectives, peasant 
slaughtered cattle, consumed stocks, and sold the tools thus thinning their means of 
survival. Thirdly, generalized collectivization dramatically changed social relations 
and shifted the locus of responsibility from the individual, the family or the 
community to large and anonymous collectives like the kolkhoz. Fourthly, 
concealment of the famine for its adverse internal and external  political consequences 
was consistent and persistent, denying any organized form of famine relief, an extreme 
but often decisive help for the doomed. In short, the population was thus deprived of   14
those mechanisms of defense and protection against stress built and tested by many 
generations. 
Are  there other long term consequences of the 1932-33 famine? This is quite difficult 
to assess since the cataclysm of the second world war wiped out the traces of earlier 
events. However a political consequence is clear: the régime tried to conceal the 
catastrophe  and the 1937 Census that revealed a population much lower then 
anticipated by Stalin (162 instead of 170 million) was “suppressed”, and the Census 
leading team liquidated. The “liberal” population policies enacted in the 20s, equating 
de facto unions and civil marriage, facilitating divorce, liberalizing abortion were 
dismantled in 1936 in favor of a policy supporting the family and restricting divorce 
and abortion (Blum and Darskij 1999). The change of policy was announced by Stalin 
in May 1935 in his speech “Man, the most precious resource”. The Soviet Union, not 
unlike Italy, Germany or Japan, became pro-natalist and pro-growth.  
VII 
  In Europe proper - west of Russia - the 20
th century demographic "seismic 
shifts"  were due to wars, to the related human losses - civilian and military - and to 
the geopolitical revolution of the continent through population transfers, refugee 
movements etc.  Due to the modifications of warfare between the first and the second 
World War - in 1939-45 warfare was less "labor intensive" and increasingly 
"technological" - the balance between military and civil losses has shifted, the latter 
having increased their share in the tally. With a relatively young age structure, fertility 
usually above replacement and long term falling mortality (excluding the war years) 
war losses were soon recovered by the European population, However, between 1913 
and 1920 the population declined from 340 to 337.7 million (-0.7 percent) against an 
increase from  97.2 to 106.5 (+9.3 percent) in the United States (Svennilson 1954: 63). 
The age group 15 to 64, however, increased from 210 to 216.3 million (+3 percent). 
Military losses in the five largest belligerent countries - Austria-Hungary, Germany, 
Great Britain, France and Italy - were close to 6 million (out of a total of 10 for all of 
Europe, including Russia), over a total of 41.5 million of mobilized men (one in 
seven) (Becker 1999: 80). 
  Did the war losses affect the economic development? Human capital was 
depleted (mobilized men underwent a medical selection; the warfare exacted a high 
number of lives among officers; many of the survivor were sick or disabled). But the   15
issue is complex: one must not forget that Europe was losing population through 
migration in the years before the war, an outflow that came to an halt during the 
conflict, in some measure diminishing the negative impact of war losses. Moreover, 
during the war many women joined the labor force, replacing men in many activities, 
in the fields as well as in the factories. Many of these remained in the labor force once 
the war was finished. In the absence of reliable and comparable data on labor force, 
figure 5 relates the change in the male population of active age (15 to 64) between 
1913 and 1920, and the change of GDP per capita over the same period for 15 
European countries. The figure shows a positive association between the two 
indicators and does not reject the hypothesis that depletion of human capital went hand 
in hand with a weak or negative performance of per capita income. However it is 
likely that countries that suffered the most in terms of human losses were also those 
whose physical capital was most damaged by the conflict and the association recalled 
above may be partly spurious.  
  The case of France is interesting. It was the European country most deeply 
scarred by the warfare on its own territory, a strip 500 kilometers long from the North 
Sea to the frontier of Switzerland laid waste. Military deaths were 1.3 million, or 34 
per thousand population, the highest rate in Europe (Becker 1999: 80). For a 
population with the lowest natural increase of Europe, the negative impact was serious. 
France had favored immigration during the war, particularly in the agricultural sector 
where the scarcity of manpower was particularly felt. Immigrants came from Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, but also from Indochina and North Africa. After the war the 
Government, faced with the task of reconstruction and the restructuring of the 
economy, initiated a policy of immigration (particularly from Italy, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia): between 1921 and 1931 the foreign population increases from 1.5 to 
2.9 million, while .4 millions foreigners were naturalized French. The gross inflow of 
foreign workers, in the period 1921-30, was 1.7 million, mostly in agriculture, mining 
and manufacturing (Garden 1988: 106-7, 112) .  
  The case of Britain was different. Human losses were lower than France's (0.7 
against 1.3 million), and Britain's demography was much more dynamic. It was quality, 
more than quantity that mattered.  A common opinion was that the war had been 
"dysgenic" because it had stripped the country of the best young people: those who 
joined enthusiastically and early the armed forces and who were in the forefront of the 
battle, were also more educated and skilled. The myth of a "Lost Generation" was   16
created. J.M. Winter has tested the Lost Generation hypothesis against the available 
data: officers had proportionally more killed, wounded, missing and prisoners of war 
than other ranks. Members  of the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford who joined 
the Army had a much higher proportion of casualties then average (Winter 1977). The 
negative effects of the war on the élites were further compounded by the gender 
asymmetry  created in the marriage market forcing many women to renounce marriage 
and forgo reproduction. The higher toll of the élites in the war is proved by French and 
Italian data: officers' mortality was substantially higher than that of man of other ranks. 
  So one provisional conclusion is that war depleted the human capital in 
quantitative and qualitative way. In terms of per capita welfare, losses may have had a 
depressive impact, at least in the short term. In the case of France - where losses had 
been very serious -  immigration provided a solution.   
VIII 
  The consequences of the 1939-45 war were deeper than those of the war of 
1914-18. Human losses were less pronounced in 1939-45 than in 1914-18 in France, 
the United Kingdom, Belgium or Italy; they were of the same order in Germany; they 
were much heavier in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Living standard fell much 
more during the Second World War than during the First, and the destruction of the 
capital stock was much more extended and pronounced. Germany lost its territorial 
acquisitions, plus East Prussia and other territories west of the Oder-Neisse line. 
Forced migrations of ethnic Germans living in Poland and Czechoslovakia added 
millions of people to the Federal Republic of Germany. The redefinition of the borders 
added some 14 million people to USSR. More than 100 million people living in 
Eastern Europe were absorbed into the socialist political and economic system 
(Maddison 1972: 468-73). Separation of the effects of the demographic shocks from 
those of a political, social and economic nature goes beyond the forces of this author  
and – perhaps – beyond the scopes of the Conference. We have seen, however, that in 
terms of “potential growth” (the ratio of the 0 to 4 to the 30 to 34 people), the 
European countries in figure 1 were better off in 1945 then in 2000 or 1920. Economic 
reconstruction in western Europe and the quarter of a century of strong growth after 
the end of the war certainly benefited from a plentiful supply of cheap labor through 
immigration; this held down the cost of labor and goods, enhanced international 
competition, promoted mobility between economic sectors. Between 1950 and 1970, 
France, Germany, Benelux countries, Switzerland had a net immigration of about 8   17
million people, mainly coming from Italy and the Iberian peninsula, areas that were 
still generating large rural population surpluses and benefited from the migrants’ 
remittances. So immigration was, for western Europe, an easy and convenient 
response to the war human losses. 
IX 
  Developments of the late ‘80s and ‘90s in the former Soviet Union and in 
Central and Eastern Europe have not ceased to produce consequences and are not yet 
“history”. But they offer many opportunities for meditation on the nature and effects 
of demographic shocks. Populations in this region have suffered a marked worsening 
of survival during the economic and political transition; fertility has declined way 
below replacement and negative growth has set in almost everywhere. The transition 
mortality crisis has been very severe in Russia and Ukraine, particularly for the male 
adult population. In Russia male expectation of life has declined from 64.2 in 1989 
(more or less the level achieved in the 60s) to a minimum of 57.6 in 1994; the 
following recovery has been modest and it is estimated that in 1999 expectation of life 
was only 59.9, about 15 years below the level of the western populations. Among 
women, the fall of the expectation of life has been smaller, from 74.5 in 1989 to 71.2 
in 1994. Declines in Ukraine have been about half those in Russia. It has been 
estimated that over the 1989-95 period the crisis has caused 2.6 million excess deaths 
in Russia and Ukraine (Cornia and Paniccià 2000: 5). In Russia, expectation of life for 
men had started deteriorating since the late ‘60s; there was an improvement widely 
credited to the anti-alcohol campaign in 1985-7, than the decline resumed in 1988-91 
and accelerated in 1992-94, with a stabilization in the following years. Increased 
mortality was particularly strong among adults 30 to 60 years old and was due, above 
all, to cardiovascular diseases, injuries and violence. Shkolnikov and Cornia 
(Shkolnikov and Cornia 2000: 272-7) have explained the crisis under five different 
headings: 
(1)Rising poverty. Poverty soared from 10 percent in 1991 to 30-40 percent in 1993-94 
- increasing malnutrition and undernutrition. However the authors estimate that the 
impact must have been reduced, owing to the modest increase of poverty-related 
diseases, such as infectious, parasitic and respiratory diseases. 
(2)The collapse of the health system; this, however, seems unable to explain the    
increased incidence of cardiovascular attacks and of violent and accidental deaths.   18
(3)The weakening of the state – testified by the increase in homicide and injury rates, 
caused by the erosion of law and order. The authors underline also the inability of 
Russian leadership to recognize the gravity of the problem and to cope with it with 
adequate policies. 
(4)Adverse change in lifestyles such as smoke and, particularly, alcohol, this latter 
closely related to the staggering increase in violent deaths as well as with a wide range 
of causes of deaths. 
(5)Rising psychosocial stress. In transitional societies, unemployment, job insecurity, 
family instability, personal insecurity, marginalization, changes in social hierarchies – 
all factors of psychological stress and disadaptation - have been rising and, in the 
opinion of the authors, contributed to the rise of mortality.”Stress and mortality rises 
were less marked among women, the youth, people in stable employment, married 
people and people with higher education” (Ibidem: 277). Alcohol consumption is 
closely associated with stress. Figure 6 shows the negative association between the 
absolute decline in expectation of life in the various regional areas of Russia, between 
1989 and 1993 and a “stress index” summarizing the impact of changes in 
unemployment, labor turnover  and marital status over the same period.  
  The Russian case – as well as events in other countries of former USSR and 
Central and Eastern Europe – suggest two relevant reflections. The first is that 
extended survival is a complex achievement, consequence of the incremental 
accumulation of material resources, scientific knowledge, technological advance, 
efficient social action and policies, correct personal behavior, control of the 
environment. Extended survival must be sustained, it is not irreversible, and it is 
jeopardized by a profound crisis – first of all political, but also economic and social – 
such as that undergone by  former USSR populations in the ‘90s. The second 
consideration concerns the relevance of psychosocial stress among the factors 
determining the mortality crisis and, therefore, the importance of policies able to 
reduce or buffer stress, such as labor policies, policies against social exclusion, 
measures enhancing personal security.  
X 
  We have dealt with a series of crises – or shocks, seismic shifts, catastrophes - of 
the past in the western world. These  were due to a variety of causes that range from 
those completely exogenous to the demographic system, such as the plague, literally   19
“disembarked” from ships coming from another continent, to those that were 
completely endogenous, such as famines generated by the inability of the economic 
system to cope with a growing population. Of course the concept of “endogenous” and 
“exogenous” depend on the definition we give of a “demographic system” that can be 
alternatively seen as a simple interplay of pure demographic phenomena, or as a 
complex web of interactions between demography, economy, society and biology. 
  In closing these pages it maybe of some interest a recapitulation of the possible 
impacts of crises and shocks on demography, economy and society. 
  Demographic consequences: losses and rebounds. Crises have a demographic 
impact, in the sense that excess deaths (for instance) and deficit of births determine a 
certain decline or a  negative “deviation” from the trend. Moreover, there is a 
selectivity of mortality (by gender, age, frailty, social characteristics etc.) that has an 
impact on subsequent demographic growth, determining “rebounds” in the short or the 
medium period (figure 1) that buffer short term losses. Consequences may also be of 
negative nature, because cohorts most affected by the crises may later suffer higher 
mortality than those not touched by it (Caselli et al. 1987).  
  Demographic consequences: structural changes. Crises may have a permanent 
demographic impact, in the sense that they might determine, or open the way for, long 
lived or permanent modifications of the demographic system. The hypothesis has been 
advanced that the plague might have caused early and high nuptiality, typical of the 
late 14
th and 15
th century, that has accelerated the recovery of population. In the case 
of Ireland, the Great Famine has opened the way for a transition to a system of late and 
low nuptiality and – perhaps - has made emigration a permanent strategy of Irish 
families. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, the recent transition may have 
(according to points of view) favored, accelerated or determined the  passage to the 
current very low fertility – way below replacement – as an adaptive response of 
families to economic hardships, curtailing of welfare, rising insecurity, competing 
appeal of new consumption models.  
Economic consequences. In rural society, crises have raised the ratio of capital (land) 
to labor, increased the price of labor, apparently improving the standard of living. 
After the plague there was a process of “deintensification” of agriculture, 
recomposition of land holdings, decline in prices and increase in real wages. A process 
of recomposition of land holdings took place in Ireland after the Famine. Historically,   20
after serious subsistence crises new cultivation – as the potato or maize – have become 
popular in many areas of Europe, finding a central place in the diet. In general, in rural 
societies, post crises societies seem not to have impeded (some would say: seem to 
have determined) an increase in personal welfare.  Modern wars, on the contrary, 
causing destruction of physical capital as well as of human capital, determine a decline 
of personal welfare in the short or medium term. 
Human capital. Post-plague societies tended to “reorganize” human capital in more 
efficient ways, particularly through the restructuring of family units in larger and more 
structured groups. Settlement was reorganized, abandoning isolated units or 
depopulated villages. Policies fostering urban immigration were enacted. Emigration 
and immigration have been powerful adaptive strategies: emigration for overpopulated 
Ireland, immigration for depleted French society after the First World War and for 
western European industrial countries after the Second World War. 
Institutions and policies. These may go in a plurality of directions and their 
categorization is a difficult. A few instances have been mentioned, such as the loss of 
power of seigneurial  estates in favor of peasantry after the plague or urban 
immigration policies. Another example is the gradual establishment in all of Europe of 
“boards of health” which monitored epidemics and reacted accordingly with measures 
of quarantine, cordon sanitaire, blockade of merchandises, patents of ships and the like. 
Or the progressive assumption by the state and public authorities of  relieving citizens  
in case of sacristy and famine, through massive purchases, procurement etc. One could 
also cite the change in population policies enacted by Stalin in 1936 after the 1932-3 
catastrophe, although one could find many other political reasons for it.  
       In general one could say that the adaptive responses to crises depend very 
much on the characteristics of societies affected, on their flexibility and ability to 
adjust at the societal as well at the individual level. This flexibility was probably much 
higher in rural societies with a moderate degree of specialization of functions, where 
people could easily replace one another. The labor force was the entire pool of able 
bodied men and women: ability to work, rather then age, was the important factor. 
Crises in rural societies had an impact because of the degree of depletion of human 
capital rather than because of the characteristics, as age distribution, of the losses. 
Families would easily reorganize themselves in more efficient units in order to provide 
labor and solidarity. Crises, and their consequences, are much more severe when the 
traditional mechanisms of solidarity, coping strategies, economic buffers are destroyed.   21
This was the case of  the 1932-33 crisis in the USSR where universal collectivization 
(going to the extreme of prohibiting cultivation of plots for personal use) deprived 
individuals of a traditional mode of life making them more vulnerable to hardship. 
Societies open to immigration were, and are, much less vulnerable to the consequences 
of human losses. 
  Conditions at the beginning of the millennium, in the rich world, are structurally 
very different. Low fertility and aging, in Europe and Japan, are at the base of the 
prospective negative demographic dynamic. We have seen, at the beginning, that 
replacement levels are much lower then at any crucial point of European history, 
perhaps with the exception of the plague times. The future will depend on (a) the 
ability to correct ongoing negative trends, through a recovery of fertility; (b) opening 
up to immigration; (c) social flexibility, through a reconsideration of the “age” and 
“gender” patterns of social functions. (1 Maggio 2001) 